BANK Indonesia (BI) again raises the risk of a global crisis “similar to 2008”. But reading this warning as a “rerun movie that is definitely going to air” is a logical leap that goes too far. More accurately, BI, through the 2025 PEKKI Report, is pointing to new fault lines in the global financial system—rising public debt, persistently high interest rates, and aggressive behavior by non-bank financial institutions (Non-bank Financial Intermediaries—NBFI) operating in developed-country government bonds and complex derivatives with thin capital buffers.
This is not merely an abstract concern. Global public debt is already very large—around US$110.9 trillion or 94.6 percent of global GDP—while risky asset valuations are vulnerable to correction if earnings expectations are missed, and government bond markets are under pressure from widening fiscal deficits. At the same time, NBFIs now manage a huge share of global financial assets and are tightly interconnected with banks through repo transactions, syndicated loans, and other funding channels—creating new transmission channels when markets panic. The issue is not “whether a crisis is possible” (the answer is: always possible), but “whether its form will be exactly the same as the 2008 financial crisis.” Here, BI provides an important correction: the 2025 financial architecture is different.
Why the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Hard to “Copy-Paste”
The 2008 collapse occurred at the core of the system: global banks with high leverage, thin capital, low transparency, weak stress tests, and balance sheets filled with subprime securitized products. When house prices fell, losses directly hit banks—and banks are the “electric grid” of the economy.
After 2008, the world became like someone after a major accident: more cautious, more seatbelts. Basel III strengthened capital and liquidity, stress tests were tightened, risk transparency improved, and standardized derivatives were increasingly required to go through central clearing so exposures are more measurable. Many jurisdictions (including Indonesia) also strengthened macroprudential tools such as LTV ratios and countercyclical buffers, and began normalizing supervision of bank–NBFI linkages.
This means that if a shock occurs, the point of failure is not automatically the same. Today’s risks are more often found in expensive asset valuations, bank exposure to hedge funds/private credit, and liquidity risks in NBFIs and open-ended funds—so the “first wave” of shocks is more likely to come from capital markets and the non-bank sector.
New Fragilities: NBFIs, Public Debt, and Interest Rate Shocks
This is where BI’s message becomes sharp: today’s world has a new form of “hidden leverage”—no longer concentrated mainly in large banks as in 2008, but in fast-moving non-bank nodes using complex instruments that can trigger fire sales during margin calls. When interest rates remain high, bond prices fall, funding costs rise, and fiscal discipline in heavily indebted countries is tested—panic can then spread through increasingly tight funding networks.
However, there is a major difference compared to 2008: many of these risks have already been mapped by global institutions and regulators. Crisis toolkits are also more prepared—central bank swap lines, emergency liquidity facilities, resolution frameworks, and bail-in rules that were largely built while fighting the last crisis.
The conclusion: a new crisis is still possible, but it is unlikely to replicate the exact script of 2008. What tends to repeat is not the chapter itself, but the human tendency to jump from “there is risk” to “apocalypse is certain.”
Indonesia: Exposed to Volatility, but Not Fragile
What is often missing from the “2008 global crisis rerun” narrative is domestic data. First, Indonesia’s banking capital is very strong: CAR is around 26–27 percent, and FSAP 2025 notes Tier 1 capital above 25 percent, with strong SBN liquidity buffers. Second, macro-financial vulnerability is low: household debt is around 17 percent of GDP and there is no major housing boom like in many pre-2008 economies. Third, stability is maintained through KSSK coordination, and under the P2SK Law, coordination between BI, OJK, LPS, and the Ministry of Finance is further strengthened.
Of course, Indonesia is not without issues: insurance, pension funds, unit-linked products, and non-bank financing still face governance and risk management challenges. But these are better described as medium-term reform agendas, not ticking time bombs about to explode tomorrow morning.
Therefore, the rational stance is vigilance without excessive hysteria. Globally, the focus is tightening supervision of NBFIs and maintaining fiscal discipline. In Indonesia, the concrete agenda is deepening the rupiah financial market, reducing foreign exchange mismatches, strengthening NBFI supervision, and preserving fiscal space so policy remains flexible when shocks arrive.
The author is Professor of Economics, Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas YARSI, Research Director of GREAT Institute, and CEO of SAN Scientific.
