Perdana Wahyu Santosa, Professor of Economics, Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Business at Universitas YARSI, Research Director of GREAT Institute, and CEO of SAN Scientific, argues that as the 2025 fiscal year draws to a close, concerns over a revenue shortfall are resurfacing—and with them, familiar temptations for shortcut solutions. One such idea is “tax ijon,” a practice of accelerating tax payments by encouraging taxpayers to settle obligations for the following year within the current fiscal year.
The definition is simple, but its consequences are complex—affecting policy credibility, data quality, and the risk of a “hole” in the following year’s revenue. Citing the Indonesian Tax Consultants Association (IKPI), the Directorate General of Taxes (DJP) itself has clarified that no “ijon” practice exists and instead emphasizes legitimate measures within the legal framework of intensification.
Beneath the controversy over the term “tax ijon,” the core issue is how the government manages revenue pressure without creating distortions that weaken the long-term fiscal foundation.
Why the Shortfall Widens: Cycles, Commodities, and Administration
Data up to 31 October 2025 show net tax revenue of IDR 1,459.03 trillion—around 70.2% of the government’s outlook. This indicates a significant gap still to be closed in a short remaining period, especially as several major tax components contract: corporate income tax fell by 9.6% (yoy) and VAT/PPnBM declined by 10.3% (yoy).
From a macroeconomic perspective, moderating commodity prices have reduced the tax base (and non-tax revenue), while slower economic activity has also weakened VAT collection. Reuters also reported earlier in 2025 that tax revenue had declined sharply due to commodity normalization and administrative changes in tax collection, as well as disruptions linked to a problematic upgrade of the tax administration system.
On the fiscal side, the 2025 tax revenue outlook is set at IDR 2,076.9 trillion, implying a potential shortfall of around IDR 112.4 trillion from the APBN target. The deficit is projected at 2.78% of GDP under this outlook. The combination of rising targets, slowing revenue bases, and a major administrative transition (Coretax system) has made end-of-year fiscal pressure resemble a sprint run in newly worn shoes. It is at this point that the temptation of “timing manipulation” emerges.
Tax Ijon: What Happens Next Year?
Technically, not all accelerated revenue collection qualifies as “ijon.” Collecting taxes that are already due, recovering enforceable tax arrears, strengthening compliance enforcement, or closing administrative leaks are legitimate strategies. For this reason, DJP rejects the notion of “ijon” and frames its actions as strengthening payment supervision, material compliance enforcement, intensification–extensification strategies, and optimization of the Coretax system.
The problem arises if the government artificially shifts revenue across fiscal years—making structural issues appear resolved in current-year reports. DJP itself has noted that such practices distort data, undermine next year’s revenue base, and can result in negative revenue growth at the start of the following year.
From a political-economy perspective, “ijon” is tempting for two reasons: (1) headline figures show a contained deficit, and (2) policymakers gain time before structural reforms take effect. The problem is that it resembles fixing a leaking ship by moving water to another cabin.
Next year then begins with a wet floor and inflated expectations. More importantly, it obscures the real diagnosis of tax system weaknesses, which is essential for credible medium-term reform.
How to Raise Revenue Without Damaging the Foundation
First, separate “deficit management” from “system building.” Keeping the deficit below 3% is an important legal mandate. However, the method must preserve long-term credibility. Sacrificing data integrity for cosmetic fiscal numbers undermines discipline.
Second, focus on lawful acceleration rather than artificial front-loading. This means maximizing DJP’s own strategies—payment supervision, compliance enforcement, extensification, and system optimization—as genuine revenue engines rather than requesting prepayments for taxes not yet due.
Third, manage cash through fiscal instruments, not tax manipulation. If revenue pressure risks pushing the deficit close to its limit, the solution lies in transparent cash and financing management—such as short-term debt issuance adjustments—not shifting tax timing in ways that distort future years.
Fourth, avoid indiscriminate end-year spending cuts. Some analyses suggest that slowing expenditures can suppress economic circulation and reduce the tax base. Spending should therefore be selectively trimmed—cutting low-multiplier inefficiencies while preserving expenditure that supports economic activity and revenue generation.
Conclusion
The issue of tax ijon is not merely about legality, but about the quality of fiscal governance. Minister of Finance Purbaya’s approach—strengthening the tax ratio through economic growth, governance, consistent policy, and disciplined public communication—points toward a structural rather than cosmetic solution. While media narratives often favor exaggeration, a sound and disciplined APBN does not.
